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  This research investigates the impacts of reporting different kinds of trade information to 
buyers and sellers in laboratory markets, for which exchange is made through b ilateral 
bargaining.  Results suggest that public information may improve the bargaining position of 
buyers relative to sellers when there is spot delivery.  In some cases sellers earn less than in a no 
information baseline.  There is evidence of a curse o f knowledge for sellers in our information 
experiments when quantity traded for the entire market is known.  The mandatory price reporting 




  The market structure of U.S. agriculture is evolving from auction trading to closer 
coordination between the stages of production.  This coordination comes in the form of vertical 
integration, business alliances, or exclusive supply contracts.  Price in this system typically is not 
discovered through the interaction of many buyers and sellers as in auction exchange.  Instead, it 
is discovered primarily through private, bilateral negotiation.  We also note that privately 
negotiated trades are common in the transition economies such as Russia, in which open or 
centralized trading has not developed and therefore is not a significant method of marketing food 
products.   
  An important aspect of the trading institution is the information it generates for 
participants.  An auction market typically is characterized by offers and/or bids being made in 
the presence of all potential traders and anyone may accept or counter with another bid/offer.  A 
feature of private negotiation is that each price is found bilaterally by a single buyer and seller.  
The negotiation p rocess, if it occurs, is usually conducted with little formality.  Third parties 
normally are unaware of the bids and trade prices made (Buccola 1985).  There is thus an 
information shortage in this market institution, as compared to auctions.  There also  is a 
“matching” problem in private negotiation trading that is not present in auction trading.  A 
bargaining pair may be unable to trade or only make inefficient trades because differences 
between buyer values and seller costs are small or negative. Effectively, there is less competition 
in private negotiation trading as compared to auction trading.  The institutional structure of the 
market place and the market information base therefore likely impact the effectiveness of price 
discovery and market efficiency. 
  An amendment to the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946, commonly referred to as 
Mandatory Price Reporting, has been passed into federal law and was largely in response to a 
concern that bilateral traders, in particular sellers, did not have sufficient information to make 
their most profitable trades.  Mandatory Price Reporting requires the particulars of large 
negotiated transactions to be made public. Thus, agents have trade information from auction 
markets, which as mentioned are becoming smaller, a nd certain previously made negotiations.  
There is, however, reason to believe that providing agents with more information, far from 
improving market competitiveness tends to make it worse (Smith 1994).  Better-informed agents, 
perhaps through public information, are unable to ignore this information, even when it is 
advantageous to do so.  Some types of information, as we show in this paper, may increase the 
bargaining power of buyers as a group.  The information creates market power that reduces   2 
market efficiency.  This situation of more information not always being better has been referred 
to as the “curse of knowledge” (Camerer, Loewenstein and Weber 1989).   
We know the method of delivery impacts market outcomes in alternative trading 
institutions.  Here we refer to a transaction that requires production before negotiation  – advance 
production or spot delivery, or a transaction that is a forward agreement, where production 
comes after the price is decided, and there is later production-to-demand.  Spot delivery carries 
higher opportunity costs for the seller, because inventory must be held and it may not be possible 
to keep inventories across production cycles.  Hence leftover stocks become a sunk cost.  
Phillips, Menkhaus and Krogmeier (2001) examined pricing behavior for forward and spot 
deliveries where the trading institution was a double auction. Results suggest a tendency for 
prices in spot delivery to converge to a level 10% higher than prices in forward delivery.  Market 
forces take into account the added costs of advance production in spot delivery, resulting in 
fewer trades and higher prices relative to forward delivery.  Price and quantity traded in forward 
delivery with auction trading are close to the predicted competitive equilibrium.   
Forward prices in private negotiation trading also are similar to the predicted competitive 
price level.  Spot delivery prices, on the other hand, are significantly lower than forward delivery 
prices in private negotiation trading (Menkhaus et al. 2001), and seller earnings are severely 
reduced.  The advance production characteristics of spot delivery places sellers at a disadvantage 
to buyers.  Take the case of one bargaining round.  If a buyer in private negotiation trading fails 
to purchase a unit, he/she earns zero; if a seller fails to sell a production unit, he/she loses the 
cost of production. This is common knowledge for all agents.  The buyer therefore has the 
incentive to bid zero on a unit.  The seller has the incentive to accept low bids in order to avoid 
losing the total cost of production.  In repeated play the seller must be paid a price that at least 
covers costs or there will be no future production; but the bulk of the market surplus can still go 
to the buyer.  Can public information provided via a  market news report improve seller earning 




  The objective of this research is to investigate the impacts of alternative public 
information scenarios on market outcomes when there is private negotiation in spot delivery 
markets.  We create these markets in a laboratory setting, using college students as paid traders.  
Alternative market information scenarios include no information, market price from the previous 
production period, market price and quantity traded from the previous production period, and 
price reported for each trade as it occurs.  Reporting all trade prices as they occur is intended to 
more closely mimic an auction trading institution in which all trade prices are known to agents.  
We  focus on spot delivery, i.e. advance production, because it dominates in agriculture.  




  The simple model of bilateral monopoly helps to organize thinking about what market 
outcomes to expect in the private negotiation experiments discussed below.  Given market 
demand and a marginal cost schedule there are corresponding marginal revenue and factor cost 
schedules.  A monopoly seller restricts s ales and seeks a high price determined by the 
intersection of marginal revenue and marginal cost.  The monopsony buyer restricts sales and 
seeks a low price determined by the intersection of demand and the marginal factor cost 
schedule.  Figure 2 illustrates supply and demand, and marginal revenue and factor cost for our 
laboratory markets.  Units are discrete and this gives the stair-cased look.  The model generally   3 
predicts a sales level less than the competitive market level and a range of prices that bracket the 
competitive prediction. 
  We argue that advance production or spot delivery in bilateral trading throws market 
power to the buyer.  Some of the argument was sketched above, and we now provide more detail.  
Imagine sellers and buyers matched  n times, after sellers have made the production decision and 
inventory is in stock.  The seller has the opportunity to sell all stock during the  n rounds of 
matches with buyers in a production cycle.  Excess inventory however, becomes worthless at the 
end of the n
th negotiating round.  We already have noted that in the last round the buyer has the 
incentive to bid and pay virtually zero for all stock.  This price paid at the end means that zero 
should be paid in the  n-1 round, then for  n-2, and so on for all negotiation pairs.  Through 
backward induction the predicted Nash equilibrium price therefore is zero for a single production 
cycle, but if sellers make losses they will not produce in future cycles, and the market disappears. 
  The buyer in a multi-period game seeks to maximize consumer surplus.  In principle the 
buyer can offer any price for units over a production cycle; moving up the cost schedule until 
consumer surplus is maximized.  We shall assume there is no price discrimination and the buyer 
pays a uniform price.  The equilibrium price therefore occurs, we know, where marginal factor 
cost intersects the demand schedule.  Price and quantity sold are determined as if the buyer had 
perfect monopsony control of the market.  This is the multiple production cycle Nash 
equilibrium.  The result hinges on advance production delivery.  It gives the buyer bidding 
control.  Private negotiation with forward delivery restores bilateral control of the market, giving 
more market power to the seller, and we would predict higher prices. 
  Given spot trading, can symmetric (market) information about past trades transfer surplus 
to the seller and move the market toward the competitive outcome?  We believe the answer is no.  
Our reasoning goes as follows.  Suppose there is information that causes sellers to produce more 
– they move up the market supply schedule.  This has no impact on the maximum surplus buyers 
can extract from the market.  They have no interest in buying the additional units, leftover 
inventory is larger and seller earnings decline.  Suppose there is information that causes sellers to 
produce less.  It may take time for buyers to adjust, but they will pay less for fewer units, moving 
down the cost schedule, in order to maximize their surplus.  Seller earnings, or produce surplus, 
declines.  Hence we argue that any information that makes sellers produce more or less in the 
market will adversely impact their earnings. 
  In actual market trading like that constructed in our computer laboratories, with several 
buyers  and sellers, an individual agent faces a “matching risk.”  Late random matches may pair a 
buyer with a seller where one or the other may not gain from a trade.  The traders cannot find a 
reasonably positive difference between marginal value and marginal cost.  If there are n  finite 
matches in a production cycle, valuable trading time is wasted.  Hence we believe that traders 
have an incentive to trade early in a production cycle, and this may dilute some of the buyer’s 
market power.  Buyers, wishing to avoid a later mis-match, will bid the price above the pure 
monopsony level.  The matching problem can benefit sellers, because it damages the control of 
buyers in the late bargaining rounds of a production cycle.  Market information can repair this 
control, and work in favor of the buyer, by signaling buyers, for example, that plenty of 
inventory will be available toward the end of a production cycle.  Information that relieves the 
matching problem is likely to help buyers. 
  In summary, the impact of market information on an equilibrium is complicated by the 
organization of the market.  For an institutional setting in which transactions are conducted 
through private negotiation and sellers must have inventory on hand before trading commences, 
we have presented a rguments suggesting the seller cannot be helped by providing market 
information to all the trading agents.  It is, however, an empirical question, and it centers on how 
powerful is the bargaining position of buyers when there is advance production by sellers.  In the   4 
next section we describe how we construct markets to study the role of information when there is 
private negotiation 
 
Methods and Procedures 
 
  Laboratory experimental markets (Plott 1982; Smith 1982) are constructed to obtain data 
for  analyses.  This approach has merit because data from private negotiations in naturally 
occurring markets usually are proprietary and unavailable.  Laboratory markets facilitate the 
study of alternative information scenarios.  We are able to reduce the confounding  influence of 
the myriad of variables present in naturally occurring markets.  Laboratory markets provide for a 
controlled environment.  By using a sufficiently simple framework, the effects resulting from a 
change in market information or other variable can be isolated. 
 
Basic Design 
  All trading was conducted over a computer network.  Consistent with previous studies 
(e.g., Menkhaus et al. 2001) an experimental session consisted of 20 three-minute trading (or 
production) cycles.  Each cycle has three one-minute matches of buyers and sellers.  As in 
Noussair, Plott, and Riezman (1995) and Mestelman and Welland (1987) four buyers and four 
sellers participated in each laboratory market session. 
  Reservation values, unit costs, and earnings were denoted on a monetarily convertible 
currency called tokens.  The exchange rate used in the experiments was 100 tokens = 1 dollar.  
At the beginning of each session, each participant was given an initial token balance (700 
tokens).
1  Participants were told that they were free to keep this money plus any they earned from 
trading. 
Buyers were privately given a table that listed the maximum reservation (resale) values 
for each unit purchased.  Sellers were similarly provided with unit costs. Unit values and unit 
costs were identical for each buyer and each seller, respectively.  Unit values and unit costs used 
in the experiments are reported in Table 1. 
          Each buyer was allowed to purchase, one at a time, up to eight units during each trading 
period.  The first unit purchased in each period was the highest value unit, the second purchased 
was the second highest value unit, and so on.  Likewise, each seller was allowed to produce up to 
eight units and to sell them, one at a time, in a trading cycle.  The first unit  
                   
1 This initial balance was deemed necessary in our spot market experiments, because sellers must incur production 
costs prior to being given the opportunity to earn profit from sales.  An additional concern is that the initial 
endowment be large enough to preclude the possibility of individual bankruptcy early in the session, particularly for 
sellers.  In order that symmetry between buyers and sellers be maintained, the initial balance will be given to both 
buyers and sellers. 
    Table 1.   Unit Values and Unit Costs (tokens).     
 
        Unit Values    Unit Costs 
    Unit(s)     (Buyers)      (Sellers) 
  1  130  30 
  2  120  40 
  3  110  50 
  4  100  60 
  5  90  70 
  6  80  80 
  7  70  90   5 
  8  60  100 
produced (sold) was the lowest cost unit, the second unit was the second lowest cost unit, and so 
on. 
  Earnings for a buyer on each unit purchased were equal to the redemption value of the 
particular unit less the price paid to the seller.  Earnings for a seller on each unit sold were equal 
to the price received by the seller less the production cost of the particular unit. Earnings  
accumulated over the sequence of trading cycles and were displayed on the computer screen at 
the end of each trading cycle.  At the end of the experiment, participants were paid the cash 
equivalent of their earnings.  Each experiment session lasted from 2
1/2 to 3 hours, and the 
average earnings per participant was about $32.00. 
Buyers (sellers), when paired, were allowed at any time to submit bids (offers) for a 
single unit. Bids (offers) were submitted by typing t he numerical value into the computer.  The 
best bid (offer) was  displayed on each individual’s computer screen.  Valid bids (offers) were 
made to follow an “improvement” rule, i.e., the bid (offer) to be displayed to the market was 
required to be higher (lower) than that previously displayed as the best bid (offer).  Also, 
following common practice, a valid bid (offer) in our experiments was not allowed to exceed (be 
lower) than the asking (bid) price currently displayed if one existed.  A trade occurred when a 
best bid (offer) equaled the best offer (bid), or either party accepted the currently displayed bid 
(offer).  Our bargaining rounds did not allow any other communication between the agents. 
  The baseline treatment in this experiment is the competitive norm, which is detailed later.  
Test treatments involve private negotiation in a spot  market, without and with designed market 
news scenarios.  Figure 1 illustrates the design of the trading cycle for each treatment. A practice 
session (Phase 1) was conducted after the instructions for the experiment were presented to the 
participants and b efore the actual experiment began. At the end of every trading cycle, earnings 
were reported (Phase 5) and a new trading cycle then began. 
  Sellers made a production decision (Phase 2), thereby providing units for sale once 
negotiation commences (Phase 3).  Note that production costs are incurred before trading begins, 
reflecting the advance production nature of a spot market.  Sellers are allowed to sell only the 
number  of units they produce and there is no inventory carryover from one trading cycle to the 
next.
2  Buyers resell purchased units to the auctioneer at predetermined prices to make a profit on 
each unit. 
A great diversity of designs could have been used for the private negotiation institution. 
We chose a design to capture the essence of bargaining, without verbal communication or the  
     
2 This is characteristic of perishable commodities that are common agricultural/food markets. 
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 Instructions                                                Actual Experiment                                          
Phase 1     Phase 2        Phase 3     Phase 4 Phase 5
    Production       Spot
    Period             Trading        News    Earnings      
  Buyers (4)
  Sellers (4)







Yes   
-Market Price

















sending of explicit messages.  Private negotiation is a complicated process and usually involves 
strategic behavior that is fostered through repeated encounters with other agents. Reputation 
building would necessarily appear if we permitted  subjects to  choose a trading partner and 
communicate. We are not interested in investigating a repeated game between two agents, and 
our design eliminates this for the purpose of control. Buyers and sellers were randomly matched 
in the private negotiation treatments.  In these sessions, matched pairs were given one minute to 
trade and then another random match was made, for three matches during these minute trading 
session.  The trading procedures in the private negotiation sessions essentially followed those of 
the double auction except for the number of traders.  
  Relying on induced value theory (Smith 1976, 1982), the values and costs used in the 
experiment (Table 1) constitute individual demand and supply for each trading cycle (bold lines 
in Figure 2).  When summed horizontally (over four sellers and four buyers) the aggregate 
supply and demand curves are derived.  Competitive price theory predicts an equilibrium price of 
80 tokens and units traded between 20 and 24 units per period.  Adding inventory costs in the 
spot delivery setting would reduce the number of units traded and increase the price relative to 
the competitive equilibrium. Figure 2 also illustrates the bilateral monopoly solution for the unit 
values and unit costs used in our experiments.  The predicted quantity traded for the bilateral 
monopoly case is four units for both a buyer and a seller, summing over the four sellers and 
buyers would suggest sales of 16 units.  The predicted bilateral monopoly price is  
in the range of 60 to 100 tokens; the monopsony price is 60 tokens.  We are predicting prices 
close to this level, rather than the monopoly price of 100 tokens. 
Market Information 
 
  Four types of market information were investigated in this study: 
•  Variant 1 - No market news report labeled as the Spot/Private Negotiation (SPN) treatment. 
•  Variant 2  - After the trading was completed, we provided agents with the average market 
price in the cycle.  This is labeled as the Spot/Private Negotiation/Market Price (SPNMP) 
treatment.   
•  Variant 3  - After the trading was completed, we provided agents with the average price and 
units traded in the cycle. For reference the label is the Spot/Private Negotiation/Market 
Price/Quantity Traded  (SPNMPQT) treatment.   7 
•  Variant 4  - Every trade price was displayed to all participants in the session immediately 
after the trade had been made.   The treatment is labeled Spot/Private Negotiation/Market 
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Data Analysis 
          A description of the characteristics of the data generated in the experiments conducted in 
this study is provided by means of a convergence model (Ashenfelter et al. 1992; Noussair, Plott 
and Reizman 1995).  The experimental data generated over several time periods, pooled with 
cross section data (for example across the treatments described in the presentation of the 
experimental design) may be serially correlated and heteroscedastic.  Data also may be 
contemporaneously correlated between cross sections due to the same unit values/costs being 
used, as an example, between and among alternative treatments.  These complications, in the 
absence of a well-developed theory of the convergence process in markets, create problems with 
statistical analyses designed to identify patterns that may exist in the data.   
 
          We estimate variations of the following general convergence model. 
                                                   i-1                                      i-1 
           0 B P it = [(t-1)/t] + B1(1/t) + Sa jDj[(t-1)/t] + S GjDj(1/t) + uit,   
                                                  





Pit = average sale price (or units traded or earnings) across all replications and all trades for each 
of t cycles in cross section (treatment) i; 
B0 = the predicted asymptote of the dependent variable for the base category (Dj);   8 
B1 = predicted starting level of the data; 
t= trading cycles – 1,..., 20; 
i = treatment  – 1,..., 5  – competitive norm (base), spot decentralized, spot decentralized price 
report, spot decentralized/price and trades report, and spot decentralized every trade price 
reported; 
Dj = dummy variable representing treatment (competitive norm is the base); and  
uit = error term. 
 
          The asymptote values are of primary interest in this study, particularly how they differ 
across treatments.  Sale prices (and units traded and earnings) for a treatment are averaged across 
the replications to reduce the influence of individual agents. 
          The Parks (1967) method is used to estimate the model.  This is an autoregressive model in 
which the random errors uit, i=1, 2 ...5, t=1, 2, ...20, have the structures (SAS, 1993) 
                                  E (u
2
it) = sii (heteroscedasticity); 
                               E (uit ujt) = sji (contemporaneously correlated); and 
                                  uit = riu i,t-1 + ?it (autocorrelation). 
          The Parks method assumes a first-order autoregressive error structure with 
contemporaneous correlation between cross sections.  The covariance matrix is obtained by a 
two-stage procedure leading to the estimation of model r egression parameters by generalized 
least squares.  (See SAS, pp. 882-884, for details of this estimation method.)  The use of the 
Parks method allows us to take account of the unique statistical problems resulting from the 
panel data sets that consist of  time series observations on each of the several cross-sectional units 
generated in our experiments.  The method requires the number of observations per cross section 
to be balanced and the number of time series observations to be greater than the number of cross-
sections.  Differences (buyer earnings minus seller earnings) were used as the dependent variable 




          In this section the results of the following 18 experimental sessions are  summarized and 
analyzed:
3 
       
3 Six replications were conducted for the SPN and SPNMP treatments – three were conducted in which expected 
market prices for a trading period were elicited from both buyers and sellers prior to the production phase.  Price 
expectations for buyers and sellers were either equal or within a few tokens in latter periods and were slightly above 
the market price when market price when market price was not announced and slightly below market price with 
price information. A Wilcoxon nonparametric test indicated no statistical difference in average prices and quantities 
traded between the three replications whether or not expected prices were elicited.  We therefore pooled those 
replications in the SPN and SPNMP treatments. 
 
•  private negotiation spot market (SPN) – 6 replications; 
•  private negotiation spot market with reports (information) of previous period average price 
(SPNMP) – 6 replications; 
•  private negotiation spot market with reports (information) of previous period average price 
and quantities traded (SPNMPQT) – 3 replications; 
•  private negotiation spot market with immediate reports of every trade price in the same 
replication of the decentralized market (SPNMPTP) – 3 replications;   9 
The experiments generated data for several market o utcomes  – prices, quantities produced and 
traded, total earnings, and seller and buyer earnings. 
  Means and standard deviations for prices and quantities traded across replications by 
treatment for periods 16-20
4 are reported in Table 2.  Data for spot double auction trading (SDA) 
also are reported for comparison.  Private negotiation trading with spot delivery (SPN) resulted 
in lower prices and higher variances, as compared to spot double auction trading.  The price is 
lowest for the SPNMPTP treatment.  This treatment also exhibits the greatest standard deviation.  
Providing information to agents in private negotiation trading did little to raise prices and, in 
some cases, resulted in even lower prices.  Quantities traded are fewer in private  
negotiation t rading, as compared to the double auction trading with spot delivery.  Fewer trades 
generally did not result in higher prices.   
  The estimated convergence models and related statistical tests for price, trades, 
buyer/seller earnings differences, and total earnings are presented in Table 3.  We focus 
primarily on the estimated asymptotes in the discussion that follows. 
 
Table 2.  Means and Standard Deviations (SD) by Treatment for Trade Prices and Quantity 
Traded Across Replications (Reps), Periods 16-20. 
                     
 
           Price                 Quantity Traded 
Treatment (Reps)  Mean  SD  Mean  SD 
SPN (6)  74.85  4.59  15.83  2.38 
SPNMP (6)  76.62  8.24  14.40  1.48 
SPNMPQT (3)  68.01  3.47  12.67  1.99 
SPNMPTP (3)  66.92  17.39  13.47  4.12 
SDA (5)
a)  83.87  1.74  20.04  1.34 
         
                     
a)  SDA is spot double auction (Phillips, Menkhaus and Krogmeier 2001). 
Price 
          The estimated asymptotes for each private negotiation treatment is significantly below the 
competitive norm level of 80 tokens, a tendency predicted by our theory.  The greatest 
differences from the competitive norm are for the SPNMPQT and SPNMPTP treatments, in 
which the estimated asymptotes for price converge to levels of about 68 tokens.  The asymptotes 
for these two treatments are not significantly different.  Reporting the market price from the 
previous production period (SPNMP) raised price slightly above that in private negotiation 
trading without market information (SPN). The additional information associated  
       
4 Trading periods 16-20 are used to reduce the effects of learning, the majority of which likely occurred in earlier 
periods. 
Table 3.  Estimated Convergence Models and Related Statistical Tests for Price, Quantity 
Trades, Buyer Minus Seller Earnings, and Total Earnings. 
                     
 
 
Variable  Price  Qnt. Traded  Buyer-Seller Earn.  Total Earnings 
Asymptotes         
Comp. Norm  80.00  20  0.00  1200.00 
SPN  -5.83*a  -4.33*a  41.38*a  -154.58*a   10 
  (0.19)  (0.15)  (1.44)  (5.33) 
SPNMP  -3.50*b  -5.16*b  18.38*b  -195.06*b 
  (0.36)  (0.25)  (2.01)  (8.14) 
SPNMPQT  -12.70*c  -7.41*c  72.91*c  -267.25*c 
  (0.47)  (0.23)  (4.29)  (9.55) 
SPNMPTP  -11.81*c  -6.18*bc  30.72*d  -194.34*b 
  (0.83)  (0.49)  (2.50)  (7.63) 
         
     Starting Level         
Comp. Norm  80.00  20  0.00  1200.00 
SPN  -2.22*a  -3.97*a  23.30*a  -161.91*a 
  (0.64)  (0.43)  (4.68)  (16.23) 
SPNMP  -5.87*b  -4.27*a  46.00*b  -127.74*a 
  (0.95)  (0.53)  (5.92)  (20.51) 
SPNMPQT  -15.16*c  -4.27*a  120.52*c  -128.63*a 
  (1.40)  (0.71)  (12.71)  (29.27) 
SPNMPTP  -3.35ab  -4.38*a  35.99*ab  -133.55*a 
  (2.26)  (1.10)  (6.74)  (20.76) 
R
2  0.99  0.99  0.97  0.99 
 
                     
* Significantly different from zero, a=0.01.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
a,b,c,d,  - Same letter indicates no significant difference between estimated asymptotes (starting 
levels) in the respective equations.  A different letter indicates a significant difference between 
estimated asymptotes (starting levels), a=0.01. 
 
with announcing quantity traded or the trade price as it occurred apparently helped the 
bargaining power of buyers.  A comparison of the estimated asymptote with the estimated  
starting levels reflects downward trends in price over the 20 trading periods for the SPN and 
SPNMPTP treatments.  The greater downward trend is in the latter treatment. 
 
Quantity Traded 
          Estimated asymptotes f or quantity traded are significantly lower than the lower limit of the 
competitive norm quantity tunnel of 20 tokens.  Trades in SPN are approximately as predicted by 
the bilateral monopoly model  – 16 units  – and is at a level significantly greater that for other 
treatments.  Units traded in other treatments range from about 12.50 in SPNMPQT to about 15 in 
other treatments.  Starting levels are all about 16 tokens, indicating slight downward trends 
through the 20 periods, when compared to estimated asymptotes. 
 
Buyer/Seller Earnings Differences 
          The competitive equilibrium model predicts equal distribution of earnings between buyer 
and seller  – 150 tokens each.  The estimated asymptote difference between buyer and seller 
earnings are positive and significantly different from zero for each treatment.  This reflects an 
advantage to buyers in each of the private negotiation trading treatments, without or with 
information.  The sellers were least disadvantaged in the SPNMP treatment and most impacted in 
the SPNMPQT treatment.  Information was not successful in yielding price levels that resulted in 
an equitable distribution of earnings to buyers and sellers.  Buyer earnings were higher in the 
earlier trading periods than in the latter in all treatments except SPN.   11 
 
Total Earnings 
          Market efficiency was adversely affected in each of the private negotiation trading 
treatments, regardless of information given to the agents.  Bilateral trading results in fewer 




          Previous research (Menkhaus et al. 2001) indicates that advance production associated 
with spot delivery puts sellers at a disadvantage relative to buyers in the bilateral negotiation of 
prices.  Other  research (Phillips, Menkhaus, and Krogmeier 2001) reports that sellers fare better 
than buyers in auction (double auction) trading with spot delivery.  Market forces in the latter 
case signal sellers to reduce production and price increases.  Buyers benefit through increased 
bargaining power in private negotiation trading with advance production, leading to reduced 
prices.  Sellers are forced to produce less as a result, but still cannot negotiate for higher prices.   
          Alternative types of information in private negotiation trading with spot delivery, as 
provided in our experiments, do not improve the seller’s position and in some cases appear to 
improve the bargaining position of buyers, relative to that of sellers, putting sellers in a worse 
position.  There is evidence of a “curse of knowledge” for sellers in our information experiments 
when quantity is known, either explicitly (SPNMPQT) or implicitly (SPNMPTP).  
  Spot delivery imposes risk on the seller – the risk of losing the entire cost of a unit or the 
risk of selling a unit at a loss.  These losses are summarized in Table 4 for each of the private 
negotiation treatments in our experiment design for trading periods 16-20.  On average, less than 
one unit is lost per trading session among all sellers.  There is no strong evidence that the added 
information contributes to reducing this risk.  The average loss for trades for which cost 
exceeded price tends to be higher for the information treatments as compared to the SPN 
treatments without information, but these additional losses are minimal.  We conclude that the 
sellers iterate toward production decisions that minimize the losses from over-production in latter 
periods of the experiments with or without information.  The imperfect market between 
production and sales will make risk-averse agents produce fewer units, as indicated by results 




Table 4.  Losses (Tokens) from Advance-Production in Private Negotiation, Periods 16-20. 
                     
 
  Average Number  Average Loss for Trades 
Treatment  of Units Lost/ Period  Where Cost>Price 
SPN  0.50  8.28 
SPNMP  0.47  13.88 
SPNMPQT  0.43  15.60 
SPNMPTP  0.40  14.07 
  
                     
 
  Trading data for sessions 1 -3 across all replications and periods 16-20 by treatment are 
reported in Table 5.  Most trades are made in trading session 1 and 70-75% of the trades occur in 
sessions 1 and 2.  Prices are near the competitive norm for the SPN and SPNMP treatments in   12 
session 1 and for SPNMP in session 2.  We argued that price in the third match should be near 60 
tokens, but because of matching risk could be higher in earlier bargaining rounds.  Prices 
generally should be closer to 60 than 100 tokens.  Data presented in Table 5 generally support 
these predictions.  By session 3 there is a clear advantage to buyers in all treatments.  Moreover, 
buyers negotiate for lower prices in all sessions of the SPNMPQT and SPNMPTP treatments.  
Knowledge of quantity, as previously suggested, provides an increased negotiation advantage to 
buyers.  Information about quantity traded could allow buyers to be more patient and mitigate the 
“matching risk” that they potentially face.  In session 3 the buyer knows that he/she need only  
bid slightly above the unit cost for the seller and make a trade and still allow the seller  to 
produce.  By backward induction the same strategy should apply in trading sessions 1 and 2.  
This strategy is stronger when quantity is known.  
 
Conclusions and Implications 
 
          The trading institutions in agriculture are evolving from auction to private ngeotiation.  We 
find that bilateral trading with spot delivery moves the market away from the competitive norm.  
Prices and quantities traded are lower, and seller earnings are lower relative to those of buyers.  
Can public information available  to both sellers and buyers improve the distribution of earnings 
between buyers and sellers in private negotiation trading with spot deliveries?  Results of 
experiments conducted in this study suggest that sellers can be disadvantaged if quantity related 
data are publicly made available to both buyers and sellers  - a curse of knowledge in private 
negotiation trading with spot delivery.  
  The setting modeled by the experiments in this study resembles that of a feedlot as a 
producer of a commodity that cannot be held in inventory for a long period of time.  Costs can be 
sunk as in our study.  Experimental results suggest that the packer in this example would have 
increased bargaining power.  The feedlot producer would be in a take-it-or-leave-it position 
regarding price negotiation.  If the cattle are not sold they gain weight and may be discounted in 
future negotiations.  The packer need only provide a price that encourages production, something 
just above the cost.  Information on trade prices, either for those in the previous production 
period or all trade prices, does not enable the seller encourages production, something just above 
the cost.  Information on trade prices, either for those in the Table 5.  Percent Trades and 
Average Trade Prices for Each Trading Session by Treatment Across Replications and Trading 
Periods 16-20. 
                     
 









SPN  39.41  34.63  25.96 
SPNMP  40.03  32.61  27.36 
SPNMPQT  45.76  29.80  24.44 
SPNMPTP  42.10  27.78  30.12 
 
                                                                    Average Trade Prices   






SPN  78.37  74.45  69.71 
SPNMP  78.83  79.24  70.00   13 
SPNMPQT  68.51  70.10  63.67 
SPNMPTP  69.51  70.15  63.90 
 
                     
 
 
previous production period or all trade prices, does not enable the seller to improve his/her   
bargaining position.  Such information, particularly that related to quantity, seems to strengthen 
the position of the buyer.  The results of this study suggest it is possible that mandatory price 
reporting could benefit buyers more than sellers in their negotiations. 
          Additional  research is warranted to explore alternatives that might improve a seller’s 
negotiation position in private negotiation trading with spot delivery, whether in a transition 
economy or in U.S. agriculture.  Alternatives that generally would increase the bargaining 
position of sellers relative to buyers are possible avenues for future research.  Cooperative 
arrangements, for example, could provide increased bargaining power to sellers in private 
negotiation trading.  We also know that alleviating the risk of a dvance production through 
production-to-demand arrangements improves seller negotiation power. 
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